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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SE-
CRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY. By 
Mark J. Rozell.! Baltimore, M.D.: The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press. 1994. Pp. xiv, 197. Cloth, $45.00; Paper, 
$14.95. 
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 
Viet D. Dinh2 
In the foreword to this latest treatment of executive privi-
lege, series editor Michael Nelson writes that Mark Rozell is the 
right person-a nonpartisan political scientist-writing at the 
right time: "a no doubt short-lived oasis of time in which no con-
troversy about executive privilege is occurring .... " (p. x) 
Rozell made it just in time. In the year or two between the 
publication of his book and the writing of this review, there have 
been at least two noteworthy showdowns between Congress and 
the administration over assertedly privileged presidential materi-
als. In the Senate's Whitewater investigation, the White House 
cited the "governmental attorney-client aspect of the executive 
privilege" to argue against disclosure of notes of a meeting be-
tween White House officials and the President's private attor-
neys.3 In the inquiry into the so-called Travelgate affair, the 
White House invoked executive privilege to withhold documents 
subpoenaed by the House Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee.4 With the authorization of a new House subcommit-
tee to investigate the Iranian sale of arms to Bosnia, more asser-
tions of executive privilege are to be expected. 
Like the budget battle and the government shutdown, invo-
cations of executive privilege and the attendant media hoopla 
about an impending "constitutional crisis" seem like an annual 
Washington rite-a paean to the virtues and vices of a divided 
government. For those who follow and, in particular, who en-
gage in this frequent ritual, Rozell's book is useful. In 200 mostly 
readable pages, Rozell provides a good summary of the issues 
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, Mary Washington College. 
2. Associate Professor of Law. Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to C. 
Adrian Venneule and my research assistant, Brent Binge. 
3. See Refusal of William H. Kennedy. Ill, to Produce Notes Subpoenaed by the 
Special Committee to Investigate Whitewater Development Corporation and Related 
Matters. S. Rep. 104-191, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1995). I served as Associate Special 
Counsel to the Committee. 
4. See Proceedings Against John M. Quinn, David Watkins, and Matthew Moore 
(Pursuant to Title 2, United States Code, Sections 192 and 194), H. Rep. 104-598, 104th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1996). 
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and arguments relating to executive privilege. Rozell is not an 
absolutist, and his book is not a manifesto. Rather, it states and 
evaluates the substantive arguments for and against executive 
privilege. The book also provides a process-oriented analysis of 
the major executive privilege battles in recent years-thereby 
breathing political life into the doctrinal debate. Beyond that, 
unfortunately, Rozell fails to deliver completely on his most orig-
inal and tempting promise: "to resolve the dilemma of executive 
privilege." (p. 7) 
In my view, judgments about assertions of executive privi-
lege against congressional inquiries-the determination whether 
the legislative need for information outweighs the executive need 
for confidentiality-are best and properly made through a polit-
ical process of give, take, and, ultimately, compromise between 
these two branches. Rozell at times seems to acknowledge the 
primacy of this political resolution but, in the end, advocates 
some judicial intervention at some unspecified point in the pro-
cess and with reference to some ill-defined standard. 
I 
Rozell gives an overwhelmingly broad definition of execu-
tive privilege: "the right of the president and important executive 
branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the 
courts, and, ultimately, the public." (p. xi) Fortunately, Rozell 
confines much of his discussion to the most common and contro-
versial forum for executive privilege, battles between Congress 
and the President for executive materials. 
In the first chapter, Rozell highlights the arguments against 
executive privilege: 
that it lacks any constitutional foundation; that the American 
constitutional Framers were too fearful of executive branch 
tyranny to have allowed for such a power; that Congress and 
the public have a "right to know" and a need to know what the 
executive is up to; and that the right to withhold information 
has become a convenient cloak for presidents who abuse their 
powers. 
(p. 8) In Chapter 2, Rozell argues against what he summarized in 
Chapter 1. He makes the case that the presidential power to 
withhold certain information from congressional and public scru-
tiny "has clear constitutional, political, and historical underpin-
nings." (p. 21) According to Rozell, that power is not absolute; 
"[r]ather, the Framers provided the president with a general 
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grant of power that would enable him to take actions necessary 
to protect the national security." (p. 21) 
Predictably. much of the discussion focuses on the argu-
ments advanced by Raoul Berger, whose works stand among the 
most vigorous and rigorous critiques of executive privilege.s De-
spite the labeling of his analysis as an effort to summarize the 
debate. Rozell does not hide the ball. He states up front that 
''this book stands as a challenge to Berger's analysis" and "the 
evidence weighs in favor of the constitutional legitimacy of exec-
utive privilege." (p. xi) 
The most convincing "evidence" presented by Rozell are 
those arguments rooted in the text, structure, and history of the 
Constitution. Those arguments, well developed by others and 
compiled by Rozell, point to the unmistakable conclusion that 
the Framers contemplated some executive prerogative to with-
hold information from congressional inquiry. Let's review the 
bidding. 
The starting argument against executive privilege is that no 
provision of the Constitution expressly grants the President the 
power to withhold information. Absent such an explicit grant of 
authority, the President is powerless. As Rozell quotes William 
Howard Taft, '"There is no undefined residuum of power which 
[the President] can exercise because it seems to him to be in the 
public interest."' (p. 9) The easy answer to this opening is the 
text of the Vesting Clause. Article II, Section 1 provides: "The 
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America." By contrast, Article I , Section 1 provides: 
··All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and 
House of Representatives" (emphasis added). By including the 
phrase "herein granted" and enumerating a rather lengthy list of 
powers in Section 8 of Article I, the Framers intended congres-
sional authority to be limited to the express provisions. The 
whole of the executive power instead is vested in the President; 
were it otherwise, the President would be limited to those activi-
ties specified in Sections 2 and 3 of Article II, which are rather 
scant indeed. 
The question in the next round for defenders of executive 
privilege is thus: Does the executive power include the authority 
5. See, for example. Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 
UCLA L. Rev. 1043 (1965): Raoul Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 
UCLA L. Rev. 4 ( 1974); Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth 
(Harvard U. Press, 1974) ("Executi\·e Privilege"). 
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to withhold information from Congress? The Court in United 
States v. Nixon6 attempted an answer (in a slightly different con-
text) by noting that the constitutional Convention itself was held 
in secret, and Rozell reminds us of Madison's statement that '"no 
Constitution would ever have been adopted by the Convention if 
the debates had been public."' (p. 26) Berger offers an answer 
to this argument: "The fact that the Convention deliberated in 
secret is quite irrelevant, for in the Constitution it provided for 
limited secrecy by the Congress alone, thereby excluding execu-
tive secrecy. "7 Berger is referring to Article I, Section 5, cl. 3: 
"Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from 
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in 
their Judgment require Secrecy." Here, too, the rejoinder to 
Berger is the same as above. The language of the Vesting Clause 
does not require every presidential prerogative to be enumer-
ated; the President's discretionary authority to withhold informa-
tion from Congress inheres in the executive power. Otherwise, 
the State of the Union address-the constitutional provision for 
which, Article II, Section 3, contains no express authorization to 
withhold information-would be rather long-winded. 
Rozell also marshals an array of contemporaneous writings 
by the Framers. John Jay's Federalist 64 and Alexander Hamil-
ton's Federalist 70 both list '''secrecy'" and '"despatch'" as 
among the virtues of the executive. (p. 28) And James Wilson, 
the author of the final version of the first draft of Article II, paid 
tribute to the executive's "'secrecy'" and '"dispatch''' (appar-
ently, as a member of the Committee on DetaiL Wilson was more 
prescient in his spelling) in his law lectures. (pp. 29-30) 
There are, of course, two sides to this coin. Congress must 
have the constitutional authority to investigate the executive, for 
absent such authority, the President need not provide any infor-
mation to Congress. Berger himself acknowledges the problem: 
"Neither the congressional power of inquiry nor executive privi-
lege are [sic] expressly mentioned in the Constitution. "8 Berger 
argues that an express grant of congressional authority to investi-
gate is not necessary, for an unlimited power of inquiry inheres in 
the Framers' vision of the legislature. He traces the roots of 
Congress to the British Houses of Parliament and notes that 
there was "virtually untrammeled parliamentary power of in-
6. 418 u.s. 683, 705 (1974). 
7. Berger, Executive Privilege at 206 (cited in note 5). 
8. Id. at 10. 
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quiry into executive conduct."9 Relying on James Wilson's Con-
vention tribute to the House of Commons, "the grand inquest of 
the Nation," as a check to monarchical power, Berger would find 
a similarly unlimited power of inquiry inherent in the 
Constitution.! o 
Berger's argument fails to appreciate the essential difference 
between a presidential and a parliamentary system of govern-
ment and that the Framers separated the powers of governance 
for a reason. Here Mark Rozell the political scientist shows his 
strength. Noting the influence of Niccolo Machiavelli and 
Thomas Hobbes on John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu, the 
intellectual godfathers of the Framers, Rozell argues that both 
Locke and Montesquieu favored a strong executive, albeit one 
whose inherent power must be checked and moderated. These 
checks and balances, according to Rozell, do not sap the execu-
tive of all its "energy," but rather operate from the premise that 
the President retains a broad range of residual discretionary au-
thority. (pp. 22-25) 
Failing a broad, parliamentary-like power of Congress to 
conduct an unfettered inquest on the executive, Berger would 
find the congressional power of inquiry implicit in certain consti-
tutional provisions. For instance, "the Constitution contemplates 
executive accountability to Congress, as the Article II, § 3 provi-
sion that the President 'shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed' alone should show. Who has a more legitimate interest 
in inquiring whether a law has been faithfully executed than the 
lawmaker?"Jl The implication of legislative supremacy flowing 
from this rhetorical question is not as obvious as Berger would 
assume. Perhaps the disinterested judicial branch properly 
should decide whether the President has faithfully discharged his 
constitutional duty. If such judicial power does not attach, for 
want of a case or controversy, then perhaps the Constitution con-
templates that no one should judge the executive. Congress may 
be interested in how the President is executing its laws, but its 
interest has no constitutional purchase. 
In any event, all this matters little because, beyond any claim 
of right, Congress possesses ample constitutional means to co-
erce information from the executive, most simply by tightening 
the purse strings. The problem for Berger and other congres-
sional absolutists is that, once one acknowledges that Congress's 
9. !d. at 10-11. 
10. Berger, 22 UCLA L. Rev. at 20 (cited in note 5). 
11. Berger, Executive Privilege at 3 (cited in note 5). 
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power to seek information is derived only implicitly from general 
legislative authority or from its coercive powers, then the con-
gressional power of inquiry stands on no better footing than ex-
ecutive privilege. Neither is expressed, but both are necessary 
and incident to the legislative and executive functions, respec-
tively. Congress may inquire, say, whether its laws are faithfully 
executed, but the President may withhold information if disclo-
sure would hinder his ability to execute the laws faithfully. 
Whatever else Article II, Section 3 may imply, it surely grants 
Congress no license to defeat its ultimate mandate, that the laws 
be faithfully executed. 
A review of legislative-executive controversies in the early 
years of the Republic illustrates the Framers' appreciation of the 
duality between congressional inquiry and executive privilege. 
Rozell notes that although President Washington gave Congress 
information on General St. Clair's military expeditions, at the 
same time he took "an affirmative position on the right of the 
executive branch to withhold information." (p. 34) President 
Washington likewise cited executive prerogative and refused to 
comply with the Senate's request for the correspondence of 
French Minister Morris and the House's request for information 
relating to negotiation of the Jay Treaty. (pp. 34-35) Finally, Ro-
zell points out that President Adams asserted his right to with-
hold information during the "XYZ Affair" in 1798. (p. 36) 
These accounts cast doubt on Berger's assertion that executive 
privilege "is a product of the nineteenth century, fashioned by a 
succession of presidents who created 'precedents' to suit the 
occasion. "12 
II 
Accepting some presidential prerogative to withhold infor-
mation from legitimate congressional inquiry, how does one de-
fine the boundaries of such prerogative? This, in essence, is what 
Rozell refers to as the dilemma of executive privilege. Toward a 
resolution-"[t]o restore some sense of comity and cooperation 
between the political branches on issues of executive branch se-
crecy" (pp. 142-143)-Rozell emphasizes three points. First, "ex-
ecutive privilege is a legitimate constitutional doctrine .... " (p. 
143) Second, "executive privilege is not an unlimited, unfettered 
presidential power." (p. 143) These statements do no more than 
12. Id. at 1. 
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narrow the sidelines of the game; they pose the dilemma of exec-
utive privilege rather than solve it. 
The real meat comes in the third point: "The resolution to 
the dilemma of executive privilege is found in the political ebb 
and flow of our separation of powers system." (p. 143) In other 
words, there are ''no clear, precise constitutional boundaries that 
determine, a priori, whether any particular claim of executive 
privilege is legitimate." (p. 143) Instead, Rozell proposes "a 
proper understanding of the separation of powers doctrine," one 
which recognizes that the President has prerogative powers and 
also that there are inherent limitations on those powers. (p. 147) 
Unfortunately, even accepting this "proper understanding," 
one is still left with the question that recommends the book and 
which Rozell promised to answer. That is, how exactly should a 
battle over executive privilege be resolved? Indeed, it is pre-
cisely because I adopt Rozell's moderate doctrinal view that the 
question nags. For those who believe in an imperial presidency 
or in congressional supremacy, the answer is evident. 
The question breaks down into two separate inquiries: who 
decides and by what standard. In doctrinal terms these inquiries 
are the same as two steps in traditional justiciability analysis-
whether there is law to apply and, if so, whether the judiciary is 
the proper forum to apply that law. With respect to controver-
sies between Congress and the President over executive privi-
lege, I think these two normally independent inquiries are 
merged, and the answer to both is "No." 
There is no discernible substantive standard with which to 
judge claims of executive privilege against Congress. Assertions 
of executive privilege rest on the notion that the President re-
tains some constitutional prerogative of executive judgment, "in 
the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is ac-
countable only to his country in his political character, and to his 
own conscience."J3 The prerogative is not absolute, as Rozell 
and I agree, and may have to yield to the legislative need for 
information. The point at which the privilege yields-that is, the 
balance between legislative need for information and executive 
interest in confidentiality-is of necessity case specific. Leaving 
aside the absolutist positions, there is no way to determine ex 
ante the optimal level of protection for executive confidentiality 
for every congressional inquiry. 
13. Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803). 
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More important, I do not think that, even in any given indi-
vidual case, a third party, i.e., a court, can determine the precise 
point at which the legislative need for information outweighs the 
executive interest in confidentiality. Executive decisions, includ-
ing whether to disclose sensitive information, affect and are af-
fected by a myriad of political, ideological, and practical factors, 
and there is little to recommend a court substituting its own con-
sideration of these factors. By the same token, the legislative 
need for a particular piece of information turns on the purpose of 
the inquiry, the existence of other information, and the impor-
tance of that piece of information to legislators who may be con-
templating legislative action. The contingent nature of the 
valuation of both the executive interest in confidentiality and the 
legislative need for information means that the balance between 
the two is doubly contingent and therefore not fit for adjudica-
tion by the judiciary (or perhaps any other outsider to the 
dispute). 
If not in the judiciary, then where? If not in reference to a 
discernible substantive standard, then to what? I think the an-
swer lies in the process of political interaction between the two 
competing branches. The President may, in his discretion, with-
hold information from Congress. But Congress may challenge 
the exercise of that discretion. It has constitutional authority to 
investigate executive branch activities and, when confronted with 
assertions of executive privilege, possesses ample tools to chal-
lenge the recalcitrant administration. It can, for instance, hold 
nominations, stall legislation, stop funding, and, ultimately, im-
peach executive officials. If Congress wishes to challenge the 
President's constitutional prerogative to withhold information, it 
can use its own constitutional prerogative to extort the informa-
tion from the executive by deploying this arsenal of coercive leg-
islative weapons. 
Indeed, if its legislative need for information is truly legiti-
mate and compelling, then Congress should deploy its legislative 
arsenal in pursuit of that information. Just as the President 
should not be given a free pass on assertions of executive privi-
lege, Congress should not be able to take the relatively costless 
avenue (in political terms) of passing the controversy on to the 
judicial branch. As Justice Powell wrote in a different but related 
context, "If the Congress chooses not to confront the President, 
it is not our task to do so."J4 It is through the process of give, 
14. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell. J., concurring). 
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take, and compromise between the President and Congress that 
controversies between the two branches are to be resolved. 
Rozell's thesis that "[t]he resolution to the dilemma of exec-
utive privilege is found in the political ebb and flow of our sepa-
ration of powers system" (p. 143) can have two quite different 
meanings. At some points, Rozell seems to say that the resolu-
tion depends entirely, both in process and in substance, on the 
political interaction between the President and Congress, as I 
have outlined above. Thus, he suggests that, to combat executive 
overreach, Congress should exercise "to full effect the vast array 
of powers already at Congress's disposal[,]" (p. 149) and that the 
outcome in disputes depends on "mutual accommodation and 
compromise" between the two branches. (p. 150) With respect 
to a substantive benchmark for judging assertions of executive 
privilege, Rozell writes: 
Our constitutional system cannot guarantee certitude with re-
gard to how every information policy dispute in government 
will be resolved. Nor should it. Two executive privilege 
claims that, on the surface, appear equally valid may be 
treated very differently from one another given different cir-
cumstances (e.g., political composition of Congress, member-
ship of a particular investigating committee, popularity of the 
president, etc.). 
(pp. 153-54) In other words, it seems, the answer lies in the polit-
ical process. 
But there is a second meaning to Rozell's stated resolution, 
one that does not depend entirely on the interaction between the 
two political branches. By the "ebb and flow of our separation of 
powers system," (p. 143) Rozell may intend also to include the 
judicial branch. Thus, he advocates intervention and adjudica-
tion by the judicial branch as an alternative to constitutional 
deadlock: 
Institutional conflict between the political branches should 
most often resolve informational controversies. Constant judi-
cial intervention in such controversies is neither practical nor 
desirable. Nonetheless, the courts must often get involved ... 
in disputes that the political branches cannot resolve without 
judicial intervention. 
(p. 153) What is unclear, however, is when such judicial inter-
vention is appropriate. To begin with, there is no such thing as a 
constitutional deadlock. In an ultimate endgame, Congress can 
impeach the President. And the President can resign, as Presi-
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dent Nixon did, or he may fight the impeachment. Either way, 
the controversy is resolved without judicial intervention. 
More important, it is unclear whether the political branches 
would want the judiciary to get involved in a purely interbranch 
dispute between Congress and the executive.1s The statute au-
thorizing the Senate to seek civil enforcement of its subpoena in 
federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1365, excludes from its jurisdictional 
grant any subpoena issued "to an officer or employee of the Fed-
eral Government acting within his official capacity."16 This limi-
tation was inserted after then-Assistant Attorney General 
Antonin Scalia argued that the question "whether or not the leg-
islative need for information outweighs the executive need for 
confidentiality ... is the very type of political question from 
which, even under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the courts 
abstain. "17 
Congress, of course, can entangle the judiciary in inter-
branch disputes by issuing criminal contempt citations against ad-
ministration officials. However, this too may simply be a 
stratagem in the political battle, a way to up the ante, rather than 
a genuine appeal for judicial intervention in interbranch disputes. 
Thus, despite many threats (which often led to negotiated settle-
ments), since the criminal contempt of Congress provisions1s 
were enacted in 1857, only once has a full body of Congress 
voted a criminal contempt citation against the head of an execu-
tive department or agency.J9 
In any event, it is not clear that even a criminal contempt 
citation against an administration official would necessarily draw 
in the judiciary. The contempt of Congress statute provides that, 
after a congressional body votes a citation, it is sent to the appro-
priate U.S. Attorney, "whose duty it shall be to bring the matter 
before the grand jury for its action. "2o But whether Congress can 
so command the U.S. Attorney to institute criminal proceedings 
15. By this formulation I leave aside demands for executive materials in connection 
with a criminal prosecution, such as United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Such a 
case pits not Congress against the President, but an individual's rights against governmen-
tal interests, and thus raises different, perhaps more easily answered, questions. 
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1979). 
17. Executive Privilege-Secrecy in Government: Hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee on Government Opera-
tions, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1975). 
18. 2 u.s.c. §§ 192, 194 (1857). 
19. See James Hamilton and John C. Grabow, A Legislative Proposal for Resolving 
Executive Privilege Disputes Precipitated by Congressional Subpoenas, 21 Harv. J. Leg. 
145, 147 (1984). 
20. 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1857). 
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is an open question, one that implicates the traditional executive 
discretion whether or not to prosecute alleged wrongdoing. 
The Burford controversy is illustrative of this process. In 
1982, the House cited EPA administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford 
for refusing, pursuant to an assertion of executive privilege by 
President Reagan, to produce documents relating to an ongoing 
investigation. The U.S. Attorney to whom the contempt citation 
was sent pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 194 cited prosecutorial discretion 
and refused to initiate criminal proceedings. A congressman 
threatened impeachment of the U.S. Attorney and the Attorney 
General for failure to execute the law faithfully,21 but nothing 
came of the threat. Instead of criminal proceedings, the U.S. At-
torney joined a declaratory relief action by the Department of 
Justice seeking to invalidate the congressional subpoena. The 
district court exercised its discretion to dismiss the suit and urged 
the branches to negotiate a settlement.22 The showdown ended 
when the Administration agreed to give Congress limited access 
to the documents. The U.S. Attorney then finally presented the 
House contempt citation to the grand jury, which did not return 
an indictment. These events perhaps best illustrate that, even in 
extreme circumstances, the political process does work to resolve 
disputes between Congress and the executive. 
* * * * * 
My substantive criticism of Rozell's resolution of the di-
lemma of executive privilege, in the end, is that he does not fol-
low through on his professed belief in "the normal ebb and flow 
of politics as envisioned by the Framers of our governing sys-
tem." (p. 153) It is a slight slip of faith. but one that significantly 
detracts from the coherence of Rozell's theory such that the 
reader is left wondering whether Rozell has fulfilled his promise 
to resolve the dilemma. 
My disappointment notwithstanding, the book is a valuable 
contribution to the literature on executive privilege. It is a good 
survey of the debate, and it presents the arguments in a digestible 
format. I think the book does more, but, if nothing else, it serves 
its author's purpose in revitalizing executive privilege simply by 
providing participants in the political process access to the tools 
necessary to enliven the debate. 
21. !29 Cong. Rec. 59 (1983); 128 Cong. Rec. 32905 (1982). 
22. Unired Srares v. House of Represenrarives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1983). 
